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To monitor and characterize oseltamivir-resistant (OR) 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus with the H275Y mutation, 
we analyzed 4,307 clinical specimens from Japan by 
neuraminidase (NA) sequencing or inhibition assay; 61 OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses were detected. NA inhibition 
assay and M2 sequencing indicated that OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus was resistant to M2 inhibitors, but 
sensitive to zanamivir. Full-genome sequencing showed OR 
and oseltamivir-sensitive (OS) viruses had high sequence 
similarity, indicating that domestic OR virus was derived 
from OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. Hemagglutination 
inhibition test demonstrated that OR and OS pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 viruses were antigenically similar to the A/
California/7/2009 vaccine strain. Of 61 case-patients with 
OR viruses, 45 received oseltamivir as treatment and 10 
received it as prophylaxis, which suggests that most cases 
emerged sporadically from OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009, due 
to selective pressure. No evidence of sustained spread of 
OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was found in Japan; however, 2 
suspected incidents of human-to-human transmission were 
reported.
I
n March and early April of 2009, a new swine-origin 
A/H1N1 inﬂ  uenza virus, now called pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, emerged in Mexico and the United States and 
spread rapidly (1–3). On June 11, 2009, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared a phase-6 pandemic alert, 
indicating a global pandemic. The earliest virus isolates 
were sensitive to the neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) 
zanamivir and oseltamivir, but resistant to M2 inhibitors, 
such as amantadine and rimantadine (1,3–5). Thus, the 
NAIs have been used globally for treatment and prophylaxis 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus inﬂ  ection.
Oseltamivir-resistant (OR) pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was 
ﬁ  rst detected in Japan, Denmark, and Hong Kong during 
May–June 2009 and has since been sporadically identiﬁ  ed 
around the world (6–8). The OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
viruses have a speciﬁ  c NA mutation, a histidine-to-tyrosine 
substitution at amino acid position 275 (N1 numbering, 
H275Y), that confers resistance to oseltamivir. In a report 
of 39 OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases (as of October 
22, 2009), 16 were associated with treatment, 13 were 
associated with postexposure prophylaxis, 3 were in NAI-
untreated patients, and 7 were of unknown association 
(8). Preliminary global NAI surveillance showed 190 OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infections among >15,000 clinical 
specimens; thus, the global frequency of OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 was <1.5% (as of January 8, 2010) (9). These 
reports indicated that human-to-human transmission of OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was limited but that oseltamivir 
treatment and prophylaxis could lead to emergence of OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
A report for 1997–2007 showed that Japan accounted 
for  ≈70% of the world’s oseltamivir consumption (10). 
From August 2009 to March 2010, 9.76 million doses of 
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oseltamivir were supplied in Japan, ≈2.3× that of the 2008–
09 seasons (data from Chugai Co. Ltd, Tokyo, Japan). 
Thus, Japan is a high-risk environment for the development 
of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus because of drug use 
pressure. The emergence of such resistance is alarming, 
because OR seasonal inﬂ   uenza A (H1N1) viruses can 
rapidly spread worldwide once they acquire the capacity 
for human-to-human transmission (11–15). Additionally, 
in the 2009–10 season in Japan, almost all cases of 
inﬂ  uenza were caused by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses 
(Figure 1). Thus, close surveillance must be maintained 
to detect pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and changes in its 
transmissibility and genetic and antigenic characteristics. 
We monitored and characterized 4,307 clinical 
specimens collected in Japan during May 2009–February 
2010 from patients with OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by NA 
sequencing, NAI assay, or both. Of them, we found 61 OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses with the H275Y mutation.
Materials and Methods
Virus Testing
Inﬂ  uenza sentinel clinics and nonsentinel institutes 
send original samples to local public health laboratories 
for detection and virus isolation. In total, 4,307 clinical 
specimens, comprising both original samples (n = 440) 
and clinical isolates (n = 3,867), underwent either full or 
partial (nt 695–1110) NA sequencing to detect the H275Y 
mutation. Samples from 1,088 cases were collected 
before oseltamivir exposure, 516 were associated with 
oseltamivir use, 103 were associated with zanamivir use, 
and for 2,600, antivirual treatment status was unknown. 
We collected all OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates and 
randomly selected OS isolates (≈10%) from local public 
health laboratories. These representative OS and OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates underwent NA inhibition 
assay (421 OS and 61 OR viruses tested), full NA and 
hemagglutination (HA) sequencing (190 OS and 61 OR), 
internal gene (PB2/PB1/PA/NP/M/NS) sequencing (138 
OS and 20 OR), and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test 
(583 OS and 59 OR).
Sequence Analysis
Phylogenetic trees of NA and HA genes were 
constructed by neighbor-joining method. A phylogenetic 
tree was constructed by using representative OR and OS 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates from several prefectures 
of Japan. Sequence information of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
from other countries was downloaded from the Global 
Initiative on Sharing Avian Inﬂ  uenza Data (GISAID) and 
GenBank. All amino acid positions in the phylogenetic tree 
were described by N1 numbering.
NAI Assay
A chemiluminescent NAI assay was performed with 
the NA-star kit (Applied Biosystems, Tokyo, Japan) 
(13). Brieﬂ  y,  ﬁ   nal drug concentration was 0.03–6,500 
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Figure 1. Weekly cases of inﬂ  uenza and isolation or detection of 
inﬂ  uenza viruses by inﬂ  uenza sentinel clinics (A) and nonsentinel 
clinics (B) from week 36 of 2008 to week 9 of 2010 in Japan (as of 
March 9, 2010). Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (A/H1N1pdm) surveillance 
in Japan was divided into 4 stages depending on the prevalence 
situation, as shown in panel B: a) case-based surveillance (April 
28–July 23), b) outbreak and hospitalization surveillance (July 24–
August 24), c) hospitalization surveillance (August 25–December 
20), and d) severe/fatal case surveillance (December 21 onwards). 
The sentinel clinics, consisting of 3,000 pediatric clinics and 2,000 
internal medical clinics, collected samples randomly, while the 
nonsentinel clinics collected samples depending on the surveillance 
stage. Local public health laboratories randomly selected these 
samples for neuraminidase (NA) surveillance from both sentinel 
and nonsentinel clinics. In this study, 4,307 clinical specimens, 
comprising both original samples (n = 440) and isolates (n = 3,867), 
were subjected to full or partial NA sequencing for detection of the 
H275Y mutation. All oseltamivir-resistant (n = 61) and ≈10% of 
oseltamivir-susceptible pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 421) isolates 
were then subjected to NA assay. The treatment history of the 4,307 
cases consists of NA inhibitor–untreated (n = 1,088), oseltamivir 
use (n = 516), zanamivir use (n = 103), and unknown history (n = 
2,600). Black line in panel A indicates weekly cases of inﬂ  uenza-
like illness per inﬂ  uenza sentinel clinic. RESEARCH
nM for oseltamivir and 0.03–12,500 nM for zanamivir. 
Chemiluminescence was assayed with an LB940 plate 
reader (Berthhold Technologies, Bad Wilbad, Germany). 
Drug concentrations required for 50% inhibitory 
concentration of NA activity (IC50) were calculated with 
MikroWin 2000 software (ver. 4; Mikrotek Laborsysteme 
GmbH, Overath, Germany). To validate the NAI assay, 
we used already characterized drug-resistant viruses and 
sensitive counterparts as controls: A/Hokkaido/15/2002 
(155H) and A/Hokkaido/9/2002 (155Y), zanamivir (16); A/
Denmark/528/2009pdm (275Y), A/Denmark/524/2009pdm 
(275H), seasonal-H1N1 A/Yamagata/68/2008 (275Y), A/
Yamagata/41/2008 (275H), oseltamivir.
Statistical Analyses
Box-and-whisker plots were used to determine the 
cutoff value between NAI-resistant (outlier) and -sensitive 
viruses. The box contains 50% of the results, representing 
the middle 2 quartiles (25%–75%). The length of the box 
shows the interquartile range (IQR). The cutoff value was 
deﬁ  ned as the upper quartile + 3.0 × interquartile range 
from the 25th to 75th percentile. For statistical analyses, OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses with the H275Y mutation 
were excluded from the overall population.
HI Test
An HI test was performed to evaluate the reactivity 
of ferret antiserum against the 2009/10 vaccine strain A/
California/7/2009, as described in the WHO Manual (17). 
The efﬁ   cacy of ferret postinfection antiserum against 
egg-grown A/California/7/2009 was used as a reference. 
Antiserum was treated with receptor-destroying enzyme 
II (Denka Seiken, Tokyo, Japan) and adsorbed with 
turkey erythrocytes before testing, to prevent nonspeciﬁ  c 
reactions. A 0.5% suspension of turkey erythrocytes was 
used for the HI test.
Results 
Geographic Distribution of OR Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
The 4,307 clinical specimens isolated during May 
2009–February 2010 were collected from 41 of 47 
prefectures in Japan, and the H275Y mutation was detected 
by NA sequencing. In total, 61 (1.4%) OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 viruses possessed the H275Y (n = 48) or 275H/Y 
mixed (n = 13) mutations (Figure 2). OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 emerged sporadically in several prefectures and was 
detected over a period of several months (Figures 2, 3).
Patient Treatment History and 
Epidemiologic Background 
Of 4,307 case-patients, 516 had oseltamivir treatment, 
103 had zanamivir treatment, 1,088 were NAI-untreated, 
and the treatment history of 2,600 was unknown. Of the 61 
cases of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 45 were associated 
with oseltamivir treatment, 10 with postexposure 
prophylaxis, and 6 occurred in NAI-untreated patients; 
thus, oseltamivir treatment and prophylaxis likely 
accelerated emergence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
The relationship between time of sampling (days after 
oseltamivir treatment) and OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
detection showed that OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
was generally detected at least 4 days after oseltamivir 
treatment (Table 1).
Of the 61 case-patients, 36 (59%) were male; 19 
(31%) were 0–4 years, 25 (41%) were 5–18 years, 12 
(20%) were 19–50 years, and 5 (8%) were >50 years. 
Underlying medical conditions were known for 41; 24 had 
chronic underlying medical conditions (pulmonary [13], 
neurologic [4], blood [3], diabetes [1], kidney disease [1], 
immunocompromised [5], other conditions [2]).
Two Possible Cases of Human-to-Human 
Virus Transmission
Almost all OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases emerged 
sporadically and were not epidemiologically linked. 
However, 2 cases of human-to-human transmission were 
suspected. One was observed in Niigata Prefecture where 
2 children hospitalized in the same room were infected 
with OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus within a few days. 
Symptoms developed ﬁ  rst in a 4-year-old girl on October 10, 
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Figure 2. Geographic distribution of H275Y-harboring oseltamivir-
resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses in Japan, May 2009–
February 2010. Values are no. oseltamivir-resistant isolates/total 
no. tested. Overall prevalence in Japan was 1.4% (61/4,307).Oseltamivir-Resistant Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Japan
2009, and she received oseltamivir. OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus was isolated from this patient on October 14. A 
6-year-old boy in the same room received prophylaxis (by 
treatment dosage) with oseltamivir beginning October 10. 
However, he experienced symptoms on October 13, and 
OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was isolated on October 
14. The patients were in a double room, and patients with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 were not around them. Genetic 
analyses of the 2 viruses (i.e., A/Niigata/1233/2009 and A/
Niigata/1234/2009) showed only 1 aa difference (D to G), 
at position 256 in PB2, and they also shared unique changes 
in NS1 and in PB1 (Table 2). Transmission possibilities 
were as follows: 1) OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was 
directly transmitted from the female patient or 2) an OS 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was transmitted from the female 
patient and an OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus emerged 
in the male patient. 
The other suspected instance of human-to-human 
transmission occurred in Tottori Prefecture. In a 9-year-
old boy, symptoms developed on December 18, 2009, 
and OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was isolated from a 
sample collected on the same day, before oseltamivir use. 
However, the patient’s 2 brothers were both infected with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus and had received oseltamivir 
since December 15. Although samples from these persons 
were not available, OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 likely 
emerged in 1 patient and was transmitted to the other.
Case Unrelated to Oseltamivir Use
Detailed epidemiologic information was available for 
2 of 6 persons with OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infections 
untreated by NAIs. Besides the case in Tottori Prefecture, 
another occurred in Oita Prefecture. The index patient 
had a mild cough beginning on July 12, and typical 
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Figure 3. Phylogenetic analysis of inﬂ  uenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses neuraminidase (NA) (A) and hemagglutinin (HA) genes (B). 
Most pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses possessed the amino acid substitutions S203T in HA and V106I and N248D in NA. Red, oseltamivir-
resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from Japan; green, oseltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from outside Japan; black, oseltamivir-
susceptible (OS) pandemic (H1N1) 2009; purple, 2009–10 current vaccine strains. The sampling month of each isolate is listed following 
the strain name. The phylogenetic tree of NA and HA genes was constructed by using the neighbor-joining method. Scale bars indicate 
nucleotide substitutions per site.RESEARCH
inﬂ  uenza symptoms developed on July 15. OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in a sample taken on 
July 16, before oseltamivir use. However, symptoms had 
developed in the index patient’s son on July 11; the boy 
received zanamivir on July 12 (OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus was not detected from a sample taken that 
day). No reports have indicated that zanamivir can induce 
OR virus with the H275Y mutation. The OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus may have thus emerged naturally, 
with no selective pressure. However, the index patient 
may have been exposed to an oseltamivir-treated person 
outside of her household who harbored OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus. 
Genetic Analysis
Phylogenetic analyses of the HA and NA genes 
showed that most shared amino acid changes: S203T in HA 
and V106I and N248D in NA (Figure 3). In both trees, OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates were genetically scattered 
and possessed several sporadic amino acid changes, but 
each OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was genetically close 
to OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (Figure 3). Several OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates from Japan were also 
closely related to OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates from 
other countries. 
Analysis of the genomes of representative OR (n = 20) 
and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 138) provided further 
insight into their similarities. First, comparison of the 
internal amino acid sequences of each OR pandemic (H1N1) 
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Table1. Relationship between detection of oseltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and interval from oseltamivir treatment to
sample collection, Japan, 2009–2010* 
No. samples 
Days after oseltamivir treatment, N = 516† 
Unknown 0‡ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >10
Total no. 169 54 116 54 37 31 36 7 6 1 3 2
No. oseltamivir-resistant 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
3 0 4 2 4 (1) 13 (1) 19 (1) 3 (2) 2 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2)
*Of total 4,307 specimens tested, neuraminidase inhibitor treatment history was available for 1,707; of these specimens, 516 were from patients who had 
received oseltamivir treatment. 
†Parentheses indicate prophylactic use, e.g., 4 (1) = 1 of 4 total uses was for prophylaxis. 
‡Day 0 represents the samples collected within 24 h after oseltamivir use. 
Table 2. Amino acid differences of each internal protein between oseltamivir-resistant (n = 20) and oseltamivir-sensitive (n = 138) 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, by strain, Japan, 2009–2010* 
Strain M1 M2 NP NS1 NS2 PA PB1† PB2†
A/Niigata/1459/2009 V122I I435V, N537S 
A/Osaka/2024/2009  I435V R251K 
A/Shimane/1062/2009 V127A,  T357I  I435V N448S 
A/Shimane/188/2009 A102T  I435V R54K 
A/Yokohama/1340/2009 S186N  I435V
A/Yokohama/1394/2009  I435V, F466Y 
A/Shiga/61/2009 V119I M93I I435V, A93V, 
T257A 
K660R
A/Niigata/1233/2009 M93I,
E217K
T257A  K660R
A/Niigata/1234/2009 M93I,
E217K
T257A  K660R, D256G
A/Shiga/45/2009  K660R
A/Chiba/1017/2009 
A/Iwate/3/2009 K103R‡ 
A/Mie/100/2009 S23N  T94N  V609A R251K 
A/Oita/126/2009 I100V E55G,
V103I
L370I K480R 
A/Osaka/180/2009 A33T  V103I E63K I667T  V649I,  E700K 
A/Saitama-C/88/2009 E208K M50I A70V V227I
A/Sapporo-C/190/2009 D21G
A/Shiga/43/2009  A652T 
A/Tokushima/2/2009 M311I 
A/Yamaguchi/22/2009 V379I
*M, matrix protein; NP, nucleoprotein; NS, nonstructural protein; PA, polymerase A; PB, polymerase B. 
†Of the 138 oseltamivir-sensitive pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus samples, I435V and K660R (boldface) were observed from 32 and 12 isolates, 
respectively. These changes would sporadically occur in both pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolate types. 
‡Lys (K) at position 103 in M1 protein, consensus amino acid among the oseltamivir-resistant pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, was replaced with Arg (R). Oseltamivir-Resistant Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Japan
2009 and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolate consensus 
showed that OR viruses possessed several sporadic amino 
acid changes, but did not exhibit any common amino acid 
changes unique to OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, 
indicating that the internal genes of OR and OS pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 viruses were genetically indistinguishable 
(Table 2). Second, comparison of a 2 samples from a patient 
with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 before and after oseltamivir 
treatment (A/Chiba/1016/2009 and A/Chiba/1017/2009) 
showed only the H275Y change in NA and no changes in 
any other proteins. Finally, no evidence of reassortment of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 
viruses was detected.
Of 61 pandemic (H1N1) 2009 OR isolates, those from 
13 patients were of mixed NA gene populations (H275 and 
Y275). Because all 13 patients had received oseltamivir, 
these samples would have been collected during selective 
pressure–induced generation of OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 from OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (online Appendix 
Figure, www.cdc.gov/EID/content/17/3/470-appF.htm). 
Because calculating precise IC50 values from a mixed 
population of NAI-resistant and -sensitive viruses is not 
possible (13,18), the 13 mixed isolates were excluded from 
the overall population for the purposes of the statistical 
analysis of OR.
Antiviral Drug Susceptibility
NAI data are summarized in Table 3. The average IC50 
value of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 48) for oseltamivir 
was 370-fold higher than that of OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(n = 421) viruses. For zanamivir, 3 of 482 viruses were 
identiﬁ  ed as outliers (cutoff >0.60 nM). Compared with 
the consensus sequence of OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
one OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 A/Okayama/17/2009pdm 
(0.61 nM) had a D151D/N mixture in its NA protein, 
and 2 OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009, A/Shiga/43/2009pdm 
(0.64 nM) and A/Yokohama/1538/2009pdm (0.64 nM) 
possessed I34V and I195V substitutions in the NA protein, 
respectively (online Appendix Table, www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/17/3/470-appT.htm). The IC50 values of OS and 
OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses were similar to those 
of their seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) counterpart viruses 
(Table 3).
Susceptibility to M2 inhibitors was determined by 
M2 sequencing. All tested viruses, including OR (n = 20) 
and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 138), had an S31N 
resistance marker in the M2 protein, suggesting that all 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates were resistant to M2 
inhibitors.
Antigenic Characterization
The HI test was performed to estimate the reactivity 
of OS (n = 583) and OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 59) 
virus to ferret antiserum against the 2009–10 vaccine strain 
A/California/7/2009. More than 93% of OS (n = 546) and 
OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n = 55) isolates were inhibited 
by anti-A/California/7/2009 ferret antiserum, and 5.8% and 
5.1% of OS (n = 34) and OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (n 
= 3), respectively, showed a 4-fold reduced HI titer. Only 
0.5% and 1.7% of OS- (n = 3) and OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 (n = 1), which had either the K153E or G155E 
changes in deduced antigenic sites in HA protein, showed 
at least an 8-fold reduction in HI titer. Thus, OS and OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 are antigenically indistinguishable 
and similar to the 2009–10 current vaccine strain A/
California/7/2009.
Discussion
The data presented here provide no evidence of 
sustained spread of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Japan. 
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Table 3. Summary of neuraminidase inhibition assay of oseltamivir-resistant and oseltamivir-sensitive pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus to 
oseltamivir and zanamivir* 
Strain
IC50, (nM/L) 
Oseltamivir Zanamivir
No.
isolates
 Mean ± SD 
(range)
Cutoff
value
No.
isolates
 Mean ± SD 
(range)
Cutoff
value
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
  Oseltamivir-sensitive 421 0.10 ± 0.02 
(0.05–0.19) 
>0.20 421 0.28 ± 0.06 
(0.11–0.61) 
>0.60† 
  Oseltamivir-resistant 48‡ 37.28 ± 14.06 
(20.69–80.91) 
NC 61 0.36 ± 0.11 
(0.17–0.64) 
Seasonal influenza (H1N1) (A/Yamagata/41/2008) 
  Oseltamivir-sensitive 0.09 ± 0.02§  0.24 ± 0.10  
 Oseltamivir-resistant 51.76 ± 9.54   0.37 ± 0.13  
*IC50, 50% inhibitory concentration; NC, not calculated. 
†Because both IC50 values of OS and OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses were indistinguishable, the cutoff values for zanamivir were calculated from the 
overall population (N = 482). 
‡IC50 values of 13 mixed samples with H275 and Y275 were excluded from overall population in statistical analysis of OR isolates.  
§Mean r SD IC50 values of control seasonal influenza A (H1N1) viruses were determined from 10 independent experiments for oseltamivir and 2 for
zanamivir. RESEARCH
In this study, clinical specimens were collected from both 
NAI-untreated and NAI-treated patients, so later samples 
were collected after the exertion of selective pressure by 
drug treatment. However, frequency of detection of OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was low (1.4%). Because OR 
and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates were genetically 
and antigenically indistinguishable, the current 2009–10 
vaccine would be expected to be effective against recent 
OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009. No evidence of reassortment 
with seasonal inﬂ   uenza A (H1N1) virus was detected. 
Immunocompetent patients infected with OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 showed typical uncomplicated inﬂ  uenza 
symptoms, similar to those caused by OS pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 (19).
Early reports suggested that ≈70% of the worldwide 
consumption of oseltamivir occurs in Japan (10), but 
long-term NAI surveillance in Japan from 1996 to 2007 
(10) and previous NAI surveillance (16,20,21) showed 
a low frequency of resistant viruses, suggesting that the 
transmissibility of OR viruses selected by drug pressure 
was remarkably reduced. However, beginning in November 
2007, an unexpectedly high frequency of OR seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses with the H275Y mutation was 
detected in Europe (11–15). Most were isolated from NAI-
untreated patients and were more transmissible than OS 
inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1), resulting in rapid global dissemination 
(15). In contrast, even in the 2007–08 season, OR inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) was detected only rarely (1.5%–2.6%) in Japan, 
despite the high level of oseltamivir use (13,22). However, 
OR inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) virus was detected at a far higher 
frequency (≈100%) the next year (13). Thus, the pattern of 
oseltamivir use did not correspond to the emergence and 
widespread distribution of OR inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses.
In contrast, this study and a recent report (8) found 
that OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 has been detected 
predominantly in isolates from oseltamivir recipients. 
Unlike recent OR inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) viruses, such OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses seemed to have restricted 
transmissibility among humans. These ﬁ  ndings indicated 
that oseltamivir use was responsible for the emergence of 
OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, but perhaps not for the 
widespread distribution of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
Although the reason why recent OR seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) isolates did not lose ﬁ  tness remains unclear, a 
functional defect in NA proteins caused by H275Y may 
be counteracted by permissive secondary mutations. Two 
such mutations, R222Q and V234M, have been identiﬁ  ed 
in seasonal inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) (23). Although whether the 
amino acids of the corresponding positions of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 play a similar role is unknown, the NA 
protein of this virus does have A and V residues at positions 
222 and 234, respectively; a V at position 234 was identical 
to that in a nonpermissive amino acid sequence. Other 
sporadic and some shared amino acid change(s) were 
observed in the NA protein of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
viruses, but these changes apparently did not restore viral 
ﬁ  tness, because no efﬁ  ciently transmissible OR pandemic 
(H1N1) virus was found. These observations suggest that 
the NA proteins of recent OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
isolates likely did not possess such permissive secondary 
mutation(s) (online Appendix Table).
However, all recent animal studies of OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus have shown that viral ﬁ  tness  and 
transmissibility did not differ from those of OS pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus (24–26) and had a potential to supersede 
OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. Nevertheless, OR 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 did not supersede OS pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in humans. This inconsistency may be 
explained by differences in infectious dose used in the 
animal models.
In an NAI assay of zanamivir susceptibility, statistical 
analysis identiﬁ  ed 3 outliers. One OS pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 possessed the D151D/N mutation, which has been 
reported to affect susceptibility to zanamivir in seasonal 
viruses (20,21). Two OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates 
had the substitutions I34V and I195V in NA; however, 
whether these affect zanamivir susceptibility is unclear. We 
also assayed peramivir susceptibility in representative OR 
and OS pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolates. Data suggested 
that OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, which contained 
the H275Y substitution, possessed cross-resistance to 
peramivir, as reported by another group (27).
Both case reports and preliminary NAI surveillance 
(8,19,28–32) have indicated 2 groups are at high risk for 
the generation of resistant viruses. The ﬁ  rst is patients with 
severely compromised or suppressed immune systems, 
who shed virus for prolonged periods and thus have an 
increased chance of developing resistant virus (33,34). 
WHO reported that 25% of 285 resistant cases (as of 
April 17, 2010) occurred in immunocompromised patients 
(35). The second group is persons who are receiving 
postexposure prophylaxis, who take a subtherapeutic dose 
of 75 mg 1×/day (treatment dosage is 75 mg 2×/day). This 
regimen may only partially inhibit viral replication, thus 
facilitating the emergence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
WHO recommends chemoprophylaxis only for persons 
who have a higher risk for severe or complicated illness 
(19). These groups were observed in our study.
We found that most OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
was detected in samples collected at least 4 days after 
oseltamivir treatment or prophylaxis (Table 1). However, 
the frequency of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in each day of 
treatment with oseltamivir could not be calculated because 
of a lack of treatment history data. This timing is consistent 
with that for OR seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1, H3N2) and 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses, which typically emerge 
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3–6 days after oseltamivir treatment (36–38). Additionally, 
we also observed the rapid emergence of OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus within 48 hours of oseltamivir exposure 
(39). Nontheless, 6 cases occurred in untreated patients. 
Indeed, the OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the Oita case 
may likely be a natural occurrence. We are aware of only 
2 other reports, one from Vietnam and one from Hong 
Kong, of naturally occurring OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
in untreated patients (7,40).
The greatest concern regarding OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 is that drug-resistant viruses will acquire the ability to 
be transmitted efﬁ  ciently among humans as has recent OR 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1). Two hospital outbreaks in the 
United Kingdom and the United States have been reported 
(31,32). In both, the immune systems of all patients were 
severely compromised or suppressed, indicating that these 
patients had an increased risk for not only the emergence 
of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, but also OR seasonal 
inﬂ   uenza (H1N1) virus (31,32). In contrast, particular 
attention should be paid to the Vietnamese case because 
a naturally occurring OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
caused a cluster of 7 cases in immunocompetent patients 
with no history of oseltamivir use (40).
Despite the high level of oseltamivir use in Japan, 
prevalence of OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 remains low 
(1.4%). Thus, oseltamivir remains the ﬁ   rst option for 
treating pandemic (H1N1) 2009, but zanamivir should be 
considered for immunocompromised patients. Additionally, 
as  ﬁ   rst priority for prophylaxis of both OR and OS 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection should be vaccination, 
but not antiviral agents. Conversely, a preclinical animal 
model showed that OR pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had high 
potential to acquire transmissibility without losing viral 
ﬁ  tness (24–26). Whether and how OR pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 may acquire efﬁ  cient transmissibility among humans 
are not known. Thus, vigilant monitoring of OR pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 infection and alterations in its transmissibility 
and antigenic and genetic characteristics is essential. 
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